Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 24
Number 1 Winter 2013

Article 4

1-1-2013

Collaboration and Coercion
Margaret B. Drew

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
Part of the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Margaret B. Drew, Collaboration and Coercion, 24 Hastings Women's L.J. 79 (2013).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol24/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Collaboration and Coercion†
Margaret B. Drew*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like other courts, family courts focus much effort on the pretrial
resolution of cases.1 A common perspective of family court judges is that
it is easier for shattered families to repair and thrive if the parties reach
agreement outside of the trial process.2 Many also theorize that when
parties reach resolution in a respectful and reasonable manner, client
satisfaction with the resulting agreement is likely.3
Most family courts have offered alternative methods of dispute
resolution for several decades.4 Mediation, as well as court provided
negotiation assistance, are staple examples of some mechanisms used to
reach settlement in family law cases.
Collaborative law is an alternative method of dispute resolution that
has added a different approach to settlement. While the method can be

†Reprinted with kind permission from the Irish Law Journal. First published as
Margaret B. Drew, Collaboration and Coercion: Domestic Violence Meets Collaborative
Law, 1 IRISH L.J. 27 (2012).
*Margaret Drew is a domestic violence expert who, during the 2011-2012 academic
year, was Visiting Professor of Clinical Instruction at the University of Alabama School of
Law. Professor Drew is grateful for the support of the Schott Foundation of the University
of Cincinnati College of Law and her colleagues at the College and the University of
Alabama School of Law who generously offered advice as the article was in development.
She thanks her research assistants, along with Professor Robin Runge, and the panel
members who critiqued an earlier draft as part of the 2011 NYU Clinical Writer’s
Conference.
1. Christy L. Hendricks, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 491, 492–
93 (1994).
2. Cf. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 693 (2003) (noting one judge’s advocacy for settlement and desire to
de-escalate tensions between conflicting parties).
3. See, e.g. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317,
325 (2004) [hereinafter Tesler, Family Law].
4. Mediation for family law cases has been offered in some jurisdictions since the
1970’s. Ann Milne, Mediation—A Promising Alternative for Family Courts, 42 JUV. & FAM.
CT. J. 61, 62 (1991).
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applicable in all types of litigation, the process is implemented primarily
with family law cases.5
Collaboration and Coercion discusses the dynamics of abuse. This
article is intended to be a primer on the dynamics of intimate partner
violence as well as an introduction to the concerns of domestic violence
practitioners when those who have experienced abuse are drawn into the
collaborative process. The dynamics discussion is comprehensive because
those who advocate on behalf of clients who have been abused are most
alarmed about systems actors6 who do not understand intimate partner
abuse. This leaves those systems actors unqualified to assess whether
abuse exists in an intimate partner relationship. The role of professionals
involved in the collaborative process and their response to the parties who
have lived in abusive partnerships is explored along with the dangers of
using alternative dispute resolution processes in the context of abusive
relationships. The history of challenges to using the mediation process to
resolve disputes between an abuser and the target of the abuse is included
in order to provide historical context as well as guidance to those new to
the collaborative dispute resolution process.

II. COLLABORATIVE LAW THEORY AND PROCESS
The collaborative method of resolving family law conflicts is a rational
and appealing one. During the collaborative process, disputing parties and
their attorneys participate in frequent negotiation sessions. With narrow
exceptions, counsel works outside of the litigation process. The parties and
counsel may work with a shared “team” of professionals, ranging from
therapists to financial planners. The collaborative team assists the parties
by offering advice and information with the hope that an amicable
settlement will be reached. One desired outcome of the collaborative
process is to reduce hostility between the separating partners. This can be
accomplished in many ways, but one key method is having each party feel
meaningfully “heard” by the other side. Once reasonable communication is
established, the ideal outcome is for the parties to reach a mutually
beneficial agreement assisted by coaches, legal and financial advisors, and
other professionals whose input assists the couple in making informed
decisions.7 The parties accomplish resolution in large part by meeting faceto-face in a series of negotiations. The parties are given ample opportunity
to consult with their separate legal advisors, who in turn consult with other

5. See generally Gary L. Voegele et al., Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the
Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 974–
75 (2007) (discussing the inception and prevalence of collaborative law in family law).
6. The term “systems actors” refers to those involved in legal processes and institutions.
This includes lawyers, judges, and those who support them, such as court personnel, mental
health advisors, and other advisors.
7. Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 331.
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members of the collaborative team. In this regard, the team, ideally trained
in the “psychodynamics of divorce and healthy family restructuring,”8 is
invited to consider the best interests of not only the individual parties but of
the family as a unit as well.9 While some collaborative practices might
differ in structure, most utilize much of the process described above, and
all incorporate face-to-face meetings into the basic process.
While many family law practitioners champion the collaborative
process as unique and innovative, the use of frequent face-to-face meetings
in accomplishing a result in which all parties will be invested is not unique
to collaborative lawyering. A comparable process was promoted in the
early 1980s by Phillip Harter for negotiations with government agencies.
That process is known as regulation by negotiation.10 “Early and
continuous negotiations among . . . affected interests . . . and unanimous
consent to the final negotiated rule proposal” have been identified as key
process characteristics of regulation by negotiation.11 In addition, like the
collaborative process, alternative resolution methods are available for those
not participating in the negotiation process.12
However, collaborative law practice imposes a burden not proscribed
in the regulation by negotiation process. Should the collaborative process
fail, the parties must engage successor counsel if they desire ongoing
representation. Collaborative practice dictates that counsel’s contract with
the client state that, other than in emergency situations, the collaborative
attorney will not file an appearance on behalf of the client in any ensuing,
related litigation.13 Some maintain that this provision is neither necessary
nor desirable.14

8. Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 331.
9. Id.
10. ANDREW P. MORRIS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 44 (2009). This process was
developed at approximately the same time that Stuart Webb introduced the collaborative
model as a method of resolving private legal disputes. See generally Stuart Webb,
Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its History and Current Practice, 21 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 155–57 (2008) (both authors advocating models of dispute
resolution that would encourage reasonable discussion and avoid entrenchment of
positions).
11. MORRIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 44.
12. Id.
13. Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2008).
14. Cooperative law is a similar process but permits counsel to continue to represent the
client in any subsequent related litigation. John Lande, Recommendation for Collaborative
Law Groups to Encourage Members to Offer Cooperative Law in Addition to Collaborative
Law (2007), http://law.missouri.edu/lande/publications/lande%20cooperative%20law%20
policy.pdf.
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Numerous sources discuss the varied ingredients of the collaborative
process.15 Authors agree, however, that a primary underlying assumption
in the collaborative approach is that the parties will be transparent in their
discussions and disclosures.16 Good faith is a necessity in the collaborative
law process because collaborative lawyers do not engage in the court’s
formal discovery process and, therefore, neither the lawyers nor the clients
are subject to the attendant sanctions for nondisclosure.
Without an understanding of domestic violence dynamics, the risks
created by the collaborative process may not be apparent.

III. UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE
A. THE ORIGIN AND DIFFERING APPLICATIONS OF THE PHRASE
“DOMESTIC VIOLENCE”
In using “violence” as a defining term, the phrase “domestic violence”
is misleading. The listener might believe that physical violence is a
necessary component of abuse since, in our legal culture, violence is so
often associated with physical acts. In reality, a coercive partner’s acts of
control over an intimate partner expand far beyond those that are merely
physical.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the phrase was popularized in order to
both define what was seen as the worse abuses of women and to promote
change in the laws that defined violent criminal acts. During the decades
that preceded the 1970s, virtually no legal protections for targets17 of
intimate partner violence existed.18
Those statutes, like assault and battery, that could have formed the
basis for arrest, were not enforced in the context of marriage or dating
relationships.19 However, from the inception of the domestic violence
15. See, e.g., Nancy Ver Steegh, The Uniform Collaborative Law Act and Intimate
Partner Violence: A Roadmap for Collaborative (and Non-Collaborative) Lawyers, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 699 (2009); Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA) (2010), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act.
16. Forthright disclosure is a fundamental tenet of collaborative practice. Sheila M.
Gutterman, Collaborative Family Law—Part II, 30 COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (2001).
17. The term “target” is used by the author to identify the individual who in other
writings may be referred to as the “survivor” or the “victim.” The author prefers the term
“target” as it draws attention to the exclusive focus of abuse that many partners bring to
their coercive actions. Often it is difficult for those unfamiliar with domestic violence to
understand that the abusive partner may not exhibit any signs of violence other than when
he is alone with the intimate partner. Others have found the term “target” useful as part of
the discussion of the dynamics of abuse. See generally, Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A.
Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52
SEX ROLES 743 (2005).
18. Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 160–63 (2003).
19. For example, in Bradley v. State, a ruling that stood for almost seventy years, the
court held that a husband should be permitted to exercise the right to chastise his wife
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movement, the overarching goal of targets and their lawyers has been the
target’s safety.
Early in the domestic violence movement, particular focus was given to
the lack of any meaningful law enforcement response. Battered women
who called the police often received no assistance.20 When police were
dispatched to the scene, the women were mostly told that theirs was a
private dispute and that the police could not intervene.21 When police did
take action, often it was only to tell the coercive partner to “take a walk
around the block.”22
Yet violence outside of the intimate relationship context was a concept
that both the police and the criminal court actors did understand. With a
focus on state intervention, particularly in the criminal context, the term
“domestic violence” proved effective in expanding the recognition of
violence against women. By incorporating reference to violent behavior,
the term “domestic violence” used language easily understood and adopted
by those with the authority to arrest and prosecute. Given the many
resulting criminal statutes and practices that have been enacted, including
enhanced penalties for domestic violence and mandatory or preferred arrest
policies,23 the domestic violence movement unarguably effected change.
Unfortunately, focusing on the criminal justice system and the
language of violence misled those unfamiliar with the dynamics of abuse to
assume that only those situations involving criminally defined physical
violence were credible domestic violence cases. Indeed, many civil
protection order statutes continue to require physical violence or a serious
threat of physical violence as elements to be proved before a petition can be
granted.24
Even more problematic are statutes that incorporate the criminal
definition of domestic violence into their civil protection order scheme.25
Such laws uniformly require serious physical harm or the threat of serious

without being subjected to “vexatious prosecutions.” Bradley v. Mississippi, 1 Miss. 156,
158 (1824).
20. Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and
Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 52 (2003).
21. Id.; see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1487, 1494 (2008).
22. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996).
23. Examples include California Penal Code § 243(e)(1) (West 2008) which sets a higher
maximum sentence for battery in a domestic context and Massachusetts General Laws
Annotated Ch. 209A § 6 (West 2007) which establishes mandatory and preferred arrest
policies for domestic disputes. Emily J. Sack, however, discusses the criticism of mandatory
arrest polices and how they might negatively affect domestic violence targets. Emily J.
Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1676–1680 (2004).
24. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2005).
25. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2008).
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physical harm as a prerequisite to the issuance of an emergency order of
protection.26 The imminent harm or immediate harm standard that is
needed to obtain an emergency order often focuses on recent acts of serious
physical harm or threats of serious physical harm.27 What domestic
violence lawyers and researchers recognize, and which may not be readily
apparent to others, is that nonphysical acts of control are often the
precursors, and in some cases predictors, of serious physical harm or death.
A leading group of researchers, led by Jackie Campbell, reported that in a
study of women killed by an intimate partner, only 70% overall had
reported prior physical violence by that partner.28 Traditional criminal
standards of violence do not accommodate the coercive dynamics of
domestic violence that extend far beyond acts of physical harm.
Financial, emotional, verbal, mental, and sexual control are broadly
incorporated into contemporary definitions of domestic violence. Coercive
control is a comprehensive and more appropriate term for what has
traditionally been called domestic violence.29 Judges, prosecutors, and
domestic violence lawyers can have vastly differing definitions of domestic
violence as a term of art, perpetuating the frustrations that erupt when
targets that have not been physically abused are denied legal protections. It
is not surprising then when, for example, a petitioner is denied protection
after she argues that nonphysical forms of control, such as isolation from
friends and family, have escalated and that she fears some impending
serious injury will occur next. Judges, police, and other members of the
justice system do not always understand that there is an increased level of
risk to a target when coercive tactics escalate, whether the tactics are
physically violent or not. Indeed, a court might not recognize a valid
domestic violence claim because the judge does not perceive a claim
without allegations of physical abuse as authentic, let alone dangerous.
When domestic violence lawyers use the phrase “domestic violence,” they
include in that definition any behavior that is designed to control the
intimate partner. Often those lawyers fail to adequately explain to the court
why their expanded definition of abuse includes nonphysically violent acts.
If judges understood that physical violence is just one of many coercive
tools in the abuser’s satchel, outcomes could be vastly different. Some
maintain that domestic abuse does not arise from physical violence, but
rather that “physical violence is a manifestation of oppressive power and
control dynamics within the abusive relationship.”30 Consequently, a judge
26. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03 (2009).
27. See e.g., id.; see also, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A § 4 (2000).
28. Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships:
Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1091 (1993).
29. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE
91 (2007) (explaining the dynamics of coercive control).
30. Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring the Civil Protection Orders with the
Reality of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 45 (2008).
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who does not understand the nature of intimate partner abuse, who reads a
protection order petition that is devoid of allegations of physical abuse,
may see the petitioner not only as not credible but also as “abusing the
system.”31
This misunderstanding of what places abused partners at risk permeates
all who enter into the lives of abused women and men. Lawyers,
therapists, friends and family all have a role in perpetuating the myth that a
woman’s risk is tied to physical abuse. This misunderstanding leads to
negative consequences in any setting where battered women must interact
with those who remain uneducated on the dynamics of abuse.
B. DYNAMICS OF COERCIVE CONTROL
Many women have been killed where there was no known history of
prior physical violence.32 While best practice would be for civil protection
order statutes to be amended to include nonphysical forms of control,33
many statutes would be effective as drafted if civil lawyers and judges
understood that the noncoercive tactics are inherently threats of serious
physical harm.
Coercive partners34 typically use only as many coercive tactics as are
necessary to control the target;35 if limiting the at-risk partner’s access to
financial resources or preventing her from working outside of the home
have been successful in controlling her behavior, then there may be no need
to escalate tactics to other forms of control.36 Similarly, one act of physical
violence early in the relationship gives credibility to future threats,37 such
that threats alone may be sufficient from that day forward in maintaining
control over the targeted partner.38

31. See, e.g., Stacy Moore, Family Say Courts Shut Down Restraining Orders, HIDESERT STAR, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.hidesertstar.com/articles/2010/02/03/news/doc
4b69381ed5e05699313614.txt.
32. See Campbell, supra note 28 (outlining research findings showing cases where abuser
with no prior history of spousal violence had killed their wife).
33. Jeffrey R. Baker suggests a definition that would incorporate the use of coercion
intended to control the behavior of an intimate partner as grounds for relief under the
protection order scheme. Baker, supra note 30, at 59. Missouri recently amended its statute
to incorporate coercive behavior as abuse: “‘[c]oercion,’ compelling another by force or
threat of force to engage in conduct from which the latter has a right to abstain or to abstain
from conduct in which the person has a right to engage.” MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(c)
(2011).
34. Those who harm in intimate partner relationships are referred to in many ways.
Common terms are abuser, batterer, or abusive partner. Likewise, the partner who suffers
harm is referenced in various ways, such as survivor, victim, or target.
35. See STARK, supra note 29, at 215–16 (enumerating the various control tactics that
coercive partners may employ to assert control over the target); see also Dutton &
Goodman, supra note 17, at 743.
36. See Dutton & Goodman, supra note 17, at 749.
37. Id. at 748.
38. Id.
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The collaborative practitioner may be unaware of the dynamics of
coercive control. Historically, neither law schools nor social work schools
have required domestic violence study as part of the curriculum for those
intending to practice in the family arena. Bar examinations rarely test on
the subject matter, even when family law is one of the examined topics.39
Even jurisdictions that endow specialty certificates on family law
practitioners regularly fail to test the practitioner’s understanding of
coercive control.
In both therapeutic and legal counseling, one may counsel those in
abusive relationships without any formal training in coercive control.
While lack of formal academic study does not preclude the delivery of
effective services, the lack of such training is obviously not optimal nor in
the best interests of the clients. Since the behavior of domestic violence
targets is often described as counterintuitive,40 a lack of appreciation of the
fundamental dynamics of violence can create misunderstanding between
practitioners and their target-clients. Any resulting increase in the client’s
safety risk can further frustrate and disempower the abused partner.
Safety is the lens through which competent domestic violence services
are provided. The target’s counterintuitive behavior may seem unusual or
bizarre to the untrained practitioner. Yet the behavior may be effective
safety planning for the target and her children. For example, the untrained
observer might see an abused woman as “weak” when she returns to her
sexually coercive partner after obtaining an emergency civil protection
order. However, if the coercive partner threatens to focus future abuse on
the parties’ daughter instead of the mother should the mother proceed with
a no-contact order, the mother’s decision becomes understandable. Return
to the coercive partner is particularly understandable in a jurisdiction where
the coercive parent is likely to be awarded unrestricted access to the
daughter if the mother cannot prove in court that the coercive father has
directly abused the child.41 By returning home and terminating the
protection order, the mother has executed what she believes is the best
safety plan for the child. An outside observer might see only that the
mother has failed to follow through on the “protections” offered by the
court system. Targets make what they believe to be reasonable choices in
their circumstances. These choices can be appreciated only when safety is
understood as the primary decision-making influence.

39. Cf. Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law: Situating Domestic
Violence In Law Schools, Adding The Lenses of Race and Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 309, 311–312 (2003) (noting that only some states were starting to add domestic
violence questions on the bar exam, but identified it only as “several states”).
40. Jennifer Gentile Long, Explaining Counterintuitive Victim Behavior in Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault Cases, 1 THE VOICE 4 (2006) http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/the_
voice_vol_1_no_4_2006.pdf.
41. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 115–116 (2002).
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Only familiarity with the dynamics of coercion and the range of target
responses to that coercion can prepare collaborative and other professionals
for effective assessment of abuse cases.42
C. ABUSER MANIPULATION
The coercive partner will employ any tool available to enhance control
over the target.43 This includes manipulation of systems and professionals.
Family systems therapy provides an example of professional settings that
unwittingly support the abusive intimate partner’s coercive behavior.44
Family systems therapy encourages participants to explore and adjust
whatever roles each family member plays in contributing to the problems in
the presenting relationship.45 Therapy sessions may include partners,
children, and other family members as well. However, since disclosure of
abuse can place the target at greater risk, neither abused women nor abused
children are likely to disclose the coercive behavior in the presence of the
coercive partner. Disclosure is especially unlikely in any professional
setting where the abuser has access to the target’s information. Likewise,
accountability is discouraged in a setting where resolution is the priority.
The lack of accountability for coercive behavior that resulted in great harm
to the family undermines the target’s ability to achieve safety. This
scenario is played out time and again where professionals prioritize conflict
resolution over safety.
D. UNDERSTANDING THE TARGET’S RESPONSE
There is no uniform, predictable response to trauma.46 Some targets
will be angry, verbally aggressive, and demanding. Some may have fought
back, while others are passive and quiet. While many people believe that
they can identify who is an abuser and who is a target, no psychological
test can assess who abuses or diagnose who is being abused.47 Individuals
as well as systems frequently judge target credibility by whether she
responds to abuse in their expected way.48 For example, observers might

42. Many screening tools are available. For example, the ABA Commission on Domestic
and Sexual Violence published a screening tool for attorneys that can be downloaded from
its website, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/screeningtool
cdv.authcheckdam.pdf; see generally, Ver Steegh, supra note 15, at 712–13.
43. Dutton & Goodman, supra note 17, at 743.
44. See Lynn Scoresby, Family Systems Therapy, 5 J. ASS’N MORMON COUNS. &
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 24, 27 (1973).
45. Id.
46. See generally, JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: FROM DOMESTIC
ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 86–95 (2001) (providing an overview of the various responses
to trauma that survivors may experience).
47. CLARE DALTON ET AL., NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES
WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A JUDGE’S GUIDE 19–21 (2006).
48. Gentile Long, supra note 40.
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expect a “true victim” or target to be fearful and grateful.49 The woman
who is assertive and who has fought back may be judged as not credible.50
Lawyers and other professionals may make similar judgments. Once this
judgment is made, the target may be seen as resistant, obstructionist, or
alienating when in fact her behavior is a rational response to abuse and the
resulting concern for her and her children’s safety.51 In a recent study,
some mediators noted that “the intractable position of one party may be
justified by reasonable fears.”52 Unfortunately, in the same study mediators
noted only cases involving physical abuse as inappropriate for mediation.
E. ABUSER ACCOUNTABILITY
The known method of reducing or eliminating abusive behavior is for
the coercive partner to take accountability of his actions and receive
appropriate reeducation.53 Accountability is the essential goal of successful
batterer intervention programs.54 Unsurprisingly, taking responsibility is
also the part of treatment that a coercive partner resists most.55 Coercive
partners routinely normalize their own behavior and the impact of their
abuse on others.56 Crying and saying “I’m sorry” come easily to many
coercive partners,57 while sincerity and a commitment to change do not.
While professionals acknowledge the power of apology, a coercive
partner’s apology without treatment and change is no apology at all: it is
manipulation.58
When third parties persuade a target to “forgive” the apologetic but
abusive intimate partner, they place the target in greater jeopardy.59 From
the target’s perspective, the coercive partner has manipulated third parties
into supporting his position and making himself the focus of their
sympathy.60 These well-meaning individuals may believe that they are
encouraging family healing, but the result is that the targeted partner feels

49. Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 82–83 (2008).
50. Id. at 94–95.
51. See Meier, supra note 2, at 711–12.
52. Sandra J. Perry et al., Stumbling Down the Courthouse Steps: Mediators’ Perceptions
of the Stumbling Blocks to Successful Mandated Mediation in Child Custody and Visitation,
11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 441, 460 (2011).
53. Amanda Dekki, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for State-Mandated
Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 549, 568–72 (2004).
54. Id.
55. Jane H. Wolf-Smith & Ralph LaRossa, After He Hits Her, 41 FAM. REL. 324, 325
(1992).
56. Id. at 324.
57. Id. at 326.
58. Id. at 327.
59. Id. at 328.
60. JOHN DECECCO ET AL., MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY
MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 256 (1991).
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pressured into resuming a relationship with the coercive partner. The
accomplishment of “forgiveness” or reconciliation results in the untreated
coercive partner regaining unfettered access to the target.61 The target’s
“lesson learned” is that even those that she turned to for help and
understanding have been co-opted by the coercive partner.62 This scenario
plays out in the collaborative process when the target is expected to set
aside abuse concerns in order to conduct “respectful” negotiations.
What many Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) practitioners fail to
accept is that the decision to abuse is deeply engrained in the essence of the
coercive partner’s belief system.63 The coercive partner feels entitled and
privileged.64 While control tactics might change, once the coercive partner
locks onto a target, his abusive behavior is unlikely to diminish without
appropriate intervention or his voluntary reshifting of focus to a new
partner.65
Given coercive partners’ resistance to change and to treatment, inviting
couples that have experienced abuse into the collaborative process is
dangerous.

IV. LAWYERS’ CONCERNS
A. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTITIONER’S VIEW
Because of their understanding of the dynamics of abuse, competent
domestic violence lawyers66 approach alternative dispute processes with
great caution. Generally, targets’ lawyers oppose any process that places
the parties in close physical proximity, specifically in situations where
there is either fear or a power imbalance present. Domestic violence
lawyers appreciate that any process can become a tool of a coercive partner
in maintaining control over a target. Those lawyers have particular
concerns regarding ADR in the domestic violence context because the
target may be left without the protections available through the courts.67

61. DECECCO ET AL., supra note 60, at 256.
62. Kara Bellew, Silent Suffering: Uncovering and Understanding Domestic Violence in
Affluent Communities, 26 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39, 47–48 (2005).
63. DECECCO ET AL., supra note 60, at 67, 73.
64. Id. at 76–77.
65. Id. at 77.
66. In the context of this article, “domestic violence” lawyers are those experienced in
handling cases involving coercive control and who understand the dynamics of abusive
relationships.
67. Throughout this paper, the target is referred to as “she” and the coercive partner as
“he.” This is as statistically, in heterosexual relationships, the male is the predominate
aggressor and the female is the target and the at-risk partner, but this pattern is sometimes
inverse. STARK, supra note 29, at 91. The same dynamics of abuse can be present in samesex relationships. DECECCO ET AL., supra note 60, at 16. Abuse in same sex relationships is
a serious concern and there is evidence that intimate partner coercion occurs at the same rate
in same sex relationships as in different sex relationships. Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh,
Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 287–88 (2006).
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As with mediation, domestic violence lawyers fear that the collaborative
process will permit a coercive partner to manipulate the professional
participants into allying with his position to the detriment of the partner
who was abused.68 Not only do the collaborative and mediation processes
presume that the parties will participate in good faith and be transparent,69
both processes further assume that the participants are fundamentally
reasonable people who can reach agreement if properly guided.70
Lawyers who represent targets of intimate partner abuse appreciate that
in most instances the abusive party holds deeply ingrained negative views
of women based on gender stereotypes, and that these views are a
significant part of the coercive partner’s psyche and belief system.71 These
lawyers view collaborative law professionals as naïve in their belief that the
process itself will somehow rectify any power imbalance or change a
coercive partner’s women-diminishing beliefs. Such naïveté might lead to
frustration on the part of the collaborative practitioner who does not
understand the inflexibility of one or both of the parties. This misguided
interpretation of client behavior can result in target blaming, which
ultimately empowers the coercive partner and places the target at even
greater risk. By attempting to employ the collaborative process in
resolving disputes that originate in coercive relationships, professionals can
manufacture outcomes for clients far worse than any simple failure of the
collaborative process itself might have produced in nonabuse cases.
Collaborative practice is the shoe that does not quite fit when cases
involving intimate partner coercion are forced into the model.
B. LESSONS FROM THE MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
Collaborative law proponents readily point out the differences between
the collaborative process and mediation. The collaborative process has
many client protections incorporated into the practice that are not routine in
mediation.72 For example, the parties have their lawyers present during the
collaborative meetings.73 Not all mediation models permit or require active
participation by counsel.74

68. See generally Joan Zorza, What Is Wrong with Mediation, 9 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REP. 81, 94 (2004) [hereinafter Zorza, What Is Wrong with Mediation] (describing the
various ways in which the coercive partner manipulates the mediation process).
69. Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F. Tennant, Collaborative Law—An Emerging
Practice, BOSTON B.J., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 12 (2001).
70. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 16 (2001) [hereinafter TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW];
Susan L. Pollet, Mediating Domestic Violence: A Potentially Dangerous Tool, 77 N.Y. ST.
B. ASS’N J. 42, 43 (2005).
71. STARK, supra note 29, at 213–14.
72. See Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 329–30.
73. Id. at 328.
74. See, e.g., Sarah R. Cole et al., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE, § 12:2 (3d ed.
2010) (noting that lawyers do not often participate in divorce mediation programs).
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Regular and persistent meetings are required as part of the
collaborative process, with the goal being to continue meeting until the
parties have resolved their differences.75 While mediation can require
frequent meetings as well, mediators sometimes do not permit third parties
to be in the room during sessions; nor are teams of interdisciplinary
professionals part of mediation models.76 For participants who already feel
less powerful than the other party, the lack of counsel or some other
support system within mediation can result in further disempowerment,
mitigated only by the sensitivity and skill of the mediator.77
The enhancement of the imbalance of power to the detriment of the
target in mediation and in other settings has been the primary concern of
domestic violence lawyers in opposing ADR schemes. Both the American
Bar Association (ABA) and the American National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges have voiced concerns about the use of mediation in
cases involving abuse.78 For this reason, ABA policy recommends an “opt
out” provision from court-ordered mediation for those who have
experienced abuse.79 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges suggest safety guidelines for courts that require or recommend
mediation in family law cases where abuse may be present.80
Professional mediators and others often cite only the risks to the
target’s physical safety during a session as a matter of concern. The risk of
on-going physical abuse is certainly not to be discounted. However, many
mediators do not employ any effective safety measures. Simple steps such
as having the target arrive fifteen minutes after the coercive partner or
leave fifteen minutes earlier can enhance her physical safety. That said,
there is no doubt that access to the target during mediation sessions, at
child visitation exchanges and at other times, increase the target’s risk of
further abuse: physical and/or otherwise.81

75. Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 328, 330.
76. Id. at 318.
77. See generally Nancy Thoennes, Peter Salem & Jessica Pearson, Mediation &
Domestic Violence, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CT. REV. 6, 9 (1995) (noting the importance of
ensuring that the mediation process protects the safety of abused women).
78. Linda K. Girdner, Mediation, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL
PRACTICE 4-17, 4-17 (Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
79. Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding
to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Services, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53, 60 n.45 (2005) (quoting
the following ABA resolution: “[t]hat the American Bar Association recommends that
court-mandated mediation include an opt-out prerogative in any action in which one party
has perpetrated domestic violence upon the other party”).
80. See Girdner, supra note 78, at 4–17.
81. See generally Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 274 (1995) [hereinafter Zorza,
Recognizing and Protecting] (noting that the safety risk of the target often increases after the
target has left the coercive partner).
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Collaborative lawyers cite the presence of others in the room during
negotiations as resolving the safety issue for the target.82 While the
presence of others can be protective, the possibility of physical attack is not
at the heart of the domestic violence lawyer’s objections to either mediation
or to the collaborative process. Concerns center on the emotional and
mental vulnerability of a target that can result from direct communication
with her abuser.83
Some neutrals84 believe that any agreement is preferable to a litigated
result. When agreement is the exclusive goal, ADR professionals might
unknowingly exert pressure on the less powerful party to make more and
more concessions.85 Since coercive partners can be rigid in both their
views and decision-making,86 it is then the target that is perceived as more
susceptible to the professional’s demands for concessions. Conceding to
systemic pressure typically results in the removal of settlement terms that
could reasonably accommodate the target’s needs. Exhausted, targets often
agree to unsatisfactory or unrealistic settlement terms in part to end the
process of face-to-face meetings with the coercive partner.87
Domestic violence lawyers are most concerned that the collaborative
setting promotes the continuation of the power imbalance and provides the
coercive partner with greater opportunities to exercise nonphysical forms of
control.88 Any contact with the target provides the opportunity to continue
the abuse and resume control.89 For example, a target might respond to her
abuser’s “look” or “word” that is intended to control her. That “look” or
other signal can have many consequences, intimidating the target into
making concessions not favorable to her. The “look” can cause a reaction
in the target that seems irrational to the mediator or other observer.
Meanwhile, the abusing party will appear reasonable and well-organized,
while the target struggles during the session or behaves inappropriately.
The abused party may be either nonresponsive or excessively compliant
during the mediation.90 Few mediators properly respond to this type of

82. C.f. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW, supra note 70, at 48.
83. See Connie J.A. Beck & Chitra Raghavan, Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in
Custody Mediation: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 555,
556-57 (2010); see also Pollet, supra note 70, at 43.
84. The term “neutrals” is used here to describe those who are involved in the process but
are not advocates for either party or the children.
85. Lydia Belzer, Domestic Abuse and Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for a Safer Process,
5 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 47 (2003).
86. See id. at 49–50.
87. See Pollet, supra note 70, at 43.
88. Id.
89. Marika Ramos, Advice for Abuse Victims, HELIUM (April. 27, 2009)
http://m.www.helium.com/items/203088-advice-for-abuse-victims.
90. See generally, Aimee Davis, Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution
or Setback?, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 253, 275 n.146 (2006) (describing the various
restrictions felt by victims).
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behavior within the context of coercion.91 In fact, if the mediator’s goal is
settlement rather than equity, the target’s compliance enhances that goal.
And should that third party view the target’s behavior as interfering with
the settlement process, the target might then be labeled obstructionist.92
After over twenty years of domestic violence advocacy against the use
of mediation, some progress has been made. Many jurisdictions have
improved domestic abuse education requirements for mediators. Some
jurisdictions require mediators to complete training in domestic violence if
they are to be appointed mediators through the family court.93 A welltrained mediator can recognize that power and control tactics may be in
play. Mediators sensitive to this dynamic will terminate the mediation
process if the control tactics continue or they will refer the target to counsel
for representation after an apparently imbalanced agreement is reached.
Despite initial resistance, experienced domestic violence lawyers have
come to appreciate that certain cases may be appropriate for mediation.94
While these cases may be a clear minority, lawyers now concede that in
some cases, mediation might be a valuable alternative—particularly where
a client believes that ADR will enhance her safety. Mediation is also used
in domestic violence cases where the mediated results are likely preferable
to what a particular trier of fact might order. With appropriate support that
ensures physical safety as well as safety from intimidation, a recovering
trauma target can feel empowered during the process.95 While this scenario
might be unusual, it can happen, and may be largely dependent upon how
safe the target feels before and during the process and how sophisticated
the mediator is in handling cases involving domestic abuse. A confluence
of events would have to occur for an abuse-sensitive mediator to be
effective,96 including the drawing of clear behavioral boundaries around the
coercive partner that are then enforced by the neutral, counsel, or other
third parties involved with the mediation.97

91. See Megan G. Thompson, Comment, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence:
Reformulating the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REV. 599, 616–18 (2007).
92. This seems quite plausible in mediation given that targets are not brought to the table
as equal participants and therefore seemingly counterintuitive to the mediation process. See
Davis, supra note 90, at 270.
93. Some examples include: Georgia (http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/adr/adrrules.htm),
Kansas (http://www.kscourts.org/ctruls/adrruls.htm), Michigan (http://www.supremecourt.
state.mi.us/programs/cdrp), Minnesota (http://www.courts.state.mn.us/adr/adr_info.htm),
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.330 (2001)), New Hampshire (http://www.State.
nh.us/marital/), North Dakota (http://www.court.state.nd .us/Court/Rules/ndroc/Rule8.9.
htm), Oregon (http://www.odrc.state.or.us/cdrc.htm), and West Virginia (http://www.
state.wv.us/wvsca/familyct/cover.htm).
94. Thompson, supra note 91, at 600.
95. Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence: From
Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment?, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14, 30 (2000) (discussing
the ways in which targets can use the law as an empowerment).
96. Pollet, supra note 70, at 44.
97. See Thompson, supra note 91, at 628–29.
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Mediation can be important to a target’s safety plan. One client98 felt
that she would be unsafe if she did not agree to her husband’s demand for
mediation. Believing that her best safety plan was to proceed with
mediation, she determined that after initial resistance on each item
discussed, she would “reluctantly” concede to the husband’s demands
permitting him to “win” on each issue important to him. While the
resulting agreement was lopsided in terms of asset distribution, everyone
left the process satisfied. The husband felt that he had “punished” the wife
for leaving him by depriving her of assets that he believed she valued. The
mediator, who was more concerned about a successful process than an
equitable result, was pleased that an agreement was reached. The target
obtained a divorce coupled with a feeling of enhanced safety.
The case is illustrative of the counterintuitive nature of domestic
violence for both litigants and attorneys. The client gave up rights to
property that a court surely would have awarded her. The client’s priority
was on her safety instead of what the law would have considered a fair
division of property. Ultimately, this result would not have been possible
in the collaborative setting. With collaborative emphasis appropriately on
the transparency of the process,99 disclosure of the target’s plan would have
undermined the overall values and goals of collaborative practice. The
disparity in asset division would be an obvious red flag to the experienced
collaborative team, and team members would expect an explanation.100
The explanation, however, is exactly what could jeopardize the target’s
safety. Preserving the integrity of the collaborative process would be an
expected priority for the professional team in this instance, with the client’s
goal of safety being secondary.
C. TARGET EXPECTATIONS
When newly out of an abusive situation, targets of intimate partner
abuse report that they want the abusive behavior to stop.101 Typically, they
are seeking reasonable solutions, not retribution. At the same time, targets
can have an unrealistic belief that the professionals whom the parties
encounter will be able to make the offending partner behave reasonably.
This is rarely the case. Mediation and other forms of ADR can be an
attractive alternative to a target because of her assumption that her voice
will be respected and that tactics of control will be eliminated from the
professional process. When that behavioral shift does not occur, the target
becomes hopeless and more disempowered. Discouraged and further

98. This was a case in which the author represented the wife. The wife developed her
mediation strategy as part of her safety planning.
99. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 985.
100. This is because the collaborative team’s goal is to incorporate both parties’ interests
in reaching an equitable resolution. Id. at 1018.
101. See Hoyle & Sanders, supra note 95, at 21.
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impoverished if she has been required to pay for the ADR sessions, the
target may sign a marital agreement that does not meet her needs but
accomplishes termination of the process.102
D. MUTUALITY AND NEUTRALITY THEORIES THAT ARISE DURING THE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Those involved with ADR often eliminate accountability from the
process. Moderating language to remove blame while focusing on each
party’s strengths can be an effective method of moving angry parties
toward cooperation.103 As in family systems therapy, part of the mediation
process contains both an acknowledgement that neither party has a superior
position to the other and that each has played a role in the deterioration of
the relationship. The process then expects both to engage in the rebuilding
of trust. This approach of mutuality can provide a valuable reflective
lesson for those couples not experiencing abuse. However, in relationships
that are abusive, the focus on mutual responsibility, in particular two-party
participation in the deterioration of the relationship undermines the benefits
of the process for the target and makes her more unsafe.104 In situations
where a coercive partner’s tactics of control can be contained only through
accountability, focusing any blame on the target only serves to empower
the coercive partner.105 Not only is the coercive partner not held
accountable for his actions, but focus is shifted to the target in a way that
accommodates the coercive partner’s position.
Mutuality, which diminishes the target’s claims, is commonly
employed throughout the family legal system.
Family court
implementation of the mutuality approach has been well documented.106
The practice is even more consciously employed in mediation and other
ADR practices. One theory of mediation is that neither party should be
“blamed” in the ADR setting.107 This practice carries over to the
collaborative setting and is appropriate in cases not involving domestic
abuse. Once an accusation is made, the mediator achieves “balance”
through mutuality. In order to achieve mutuality in both courtroom and
ADR settings, the target’s minor insult or other responsive behavior is
given parity with the coercive partner’s beating, sexual abuse, and
sustained verbal or emotional assault.108

102. See Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 247–48 (2002).
103. Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 186–
88 (2003).
104. Davis, supra note 90, at 270–71.
105. Pollet, supra note 70, at 43.
106. Meier, supra note 2, at 694–98.
107. Id. at 693.
108. Id. at 690–92.
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Targets often display behavior in court that negatively affects their
credibility.109 Coercive partners do not. They actually deny or minimize
the effect of their actions.110 Consequently, the mediator might hear only
about the target’s misbehavior. If the target feels that it is not safe to
disclose abuse, particularly sexual assault, the mediator will not be aware
of prior traumatizing events. This can lead to inaccurate conclusions, such
that the couple is immature or simply in “high conflict.”111 In fact,
domestic abuse cases are often confused with “high conflict” cases, where
mutuality of inappropriate behavior is foundational.112 Targets’ claims can
go unheard and unaddressed when the case is labeled as “high conflict.” A
careful review of high conflict cases by those educated in domestic abuse
reveals that many, if not most, are mislabeled. When professionals do not
understand a target’s response to abuse, her inappropriate behavior is seen
as “mutual.”113 In actuality, many cases labeled “high conflict”—because
both parties are assessed with inappropriate behavior—are actually abuse
cases114 involving a predominate aggressor.
Under noncoercive circumstances, one benefit that the collaborative
process offers is the opportunity for the participants and the larger family to
heal. When practiced sensitively and empathetically, that goal may be
accomplished for perhaps one, or even both, of the former intimate
partners.115 In theory, the collaborative process could benefit a target since
healing is sometimes best accomplished through public disclosure of the
coercive partner’s abuse.116 However, the potential for the collaborative
process to provide this benefit for the target is limited. The lawyer or other
professional who undertakes mediation or collaborative practice, knowing
that a client will be discouraged from disclosing details of abuse, may
interfere with and prevent the target’s healing.117 Likewise, when the
collaborative setting is promoted as “safe,”118 the target may assume that
she will be free from coercion and retaliation. The ADR professional,

109. Meier, supra note 2, at 691.
110. Id. at 690.
111. See Davis, supra note 90, at 269–70 (noting that most mediation screeners are not
trained to recognize abuse).
112. See Clare Dalton et al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for
Custody and Visitation Decisions, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 11 & 13–14 (2003). The term
“high conflict” often refers to couples who seemingly agree on nothing and argue about
everything. They may involve their children in their conflicts. This definition can mask
abusive relationships and be problematic for those experiencing intimate partner abuse.
113. Cf. Goodmark, supra note 49, at 107–08 (describing this theory in the context of
abuse in lesbian relationships).
114. Dalton, supra note 112, at 23–24.
115. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 999–1000.
116. Orloff et al., supra note 20, at 65.
117. See Goodmark, supra note 49, at 108–09 (referring to Barbara Hart, Lesbian
Battering: An Examination, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN
BATTERING 173, 186 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986)).
118. See Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 980.

Winter 2013]

COLLABORATION AND COERCION

97

however, will likely focus on physical safety and the target will not
understand that the professional is unable to control the coercive behaviour
that is likely to occur during and after the ADR sessions.
Collaborative and other ADR professionals often fail to acknowledge
the coercive partner’s harm to the target and the family. The process does
not acknowledge that the target did not deserve what happened, let alone
acknowledge that the target did not create the abusive situation. If focus is
on avoiding blame, and witness is not given to the coercive conduct, the
lack of voiced support could be devastating for a target. ADR practitioners
may view the lack of their voiced support as maintaining “neutrality.”119
But, the lack of acknowledgement that abuse occurred, combined with the
lack of consequences for the coercive partner, can have devastating mental
health consequences for the target, and can make her less safe.120
On the other hand, if detailed disclosure is made, the professionals then
must assess whether and how compensation will be made to the target, if
compensation is sought. These are situations that may be uncomfortable
for most family law practitioners, if not beyond their expertise. For these
and additional reasons, abuse cases may not be appropriate for the
collaborative process unless the legal team is expanded to include tort
specialists who can assist in determining compensation, but that is not
within the proper “limited service engagement” contemplated in the
collaborative law arena.121 Since the collaborative process focuses on the
couple’s moving forward, rather than compensation for suffering, the
inclusion of tort compensation as part of the settlement discussion can be
viewed as both hostile and detrimental to the collaborative process.
E. THE BELIEF THAT COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE IS THE BEST APPROACH
IN ALL FAMILY LAW CASES
By the year 2000, collaborative practice was making an impact in many
jurisdictions.122 Some proponents were convinced that litigation in family
law cases is never appropriate.123 Promoters gave little regard to cases in
which domestic violence was alleged.124 As the practice expanded, the
discussion became more inclusive and practitioners began recognizing that

119. See Davis, supra note 90, at 264.
120. In most settings, the target has some safety risks associated with disclosing abuse. A
judicial finding that abuse did not occur can increase the target’s safety risk. Any
minimization by a third party of abusive behaviour endangers the target by empowering the
abuser.
121.Voegele, supra note 5, at 1012.
122. See Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 317–18.
123. See Leah J. Pollema, Beyond the Bounds of Zealous Advocacy: The Prevalence of
Abusive Litigation in Family Law and the Need for Tort Remedies, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1107,
1113 (2007).
124. See Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 1012 (referring to TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW,
supra note 70 and noting that abuse cases are likely not appropriate for the collaborative
process).
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some cases, like those involving addiction or abuse, were most likely not
appropriate for collaborative law.125 Others acknowledged safety concerns,
but felt that the process could provide a physically safe space.126
Nonetheless, many professionals still believe that most cases are
appropriate for the collaborative process.127
Rarely does one size fit all in any process. Even though the
collaborative process can be an effective and holistic experience for many
separated partners, it is not the best method for all situations. It is
particularly helpful when practiced with empathy and a view toward the
client’s recovery from trauma.128 But when the practitioner is of the belief
that collaborative law is always the superior process in family law cases,
the rigidity of that view can disregard the needs of abuse targets.
Even though collaborative practice is but one choice of methods that a
client has in resolving intimate partner and other family disputes, the
presentation of the choices might be skewed in favor of one process over
another. For example, one leading proponent of collaborative law has
greatly discounted litigation in family law matters so as to preclude any
consideration of when litigation may be appropriate and necessary.129 This
presumption will lead to cases being forced into an inappropriate process.
Neutral assessment of resolution options is important—particularly since
no one system provides a significantly greater likelihood of settlement.130
The many benefits of collaborative law can and should be explained by
practitioners without unfairly discounting or disrespecting the benefits of
other forms of resolution including the litigation model. The legal process
can add many layers of stress and frustration to the client’s already
disturbed existence. If the collaborative process fails, the legal system
might be able to provide protection and produce results that were not
available during the collaborative process.131 Sometimes participants do
not take settlement discussions seriously until trial is imminent and only
then will they appreciate the weaknesses of their positions or the risk in
leaving the decision in the hands of a third party. Other times, because of
the extreme unreasonableness of one or both of the parties, negotiations on
any level simply fail.

125. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 1012; see also Susan M. Buckholz, Two Views on
Collaborative Law: Collaborative Dissolution, 30 VT. B.J. 37, 37 (2004).
126. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 980.
127. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW, supra note 70, at 179.
128. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 1000–01.
129. Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 317.
130. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its
Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1923-25 (2007).
131. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2005) (providing that “the court may
grant any protection order . . . or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation
of domestic violence against the family or household members”).
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Holistic approaches to healing can be found in any resolution process.
Litigation, mediation, and collaborative practice offer opportunities for
professionals to assist clients in becoming stronger and more accepting of
the outcome. The ability to help a client heal depends upon the quality of
the professional and is not tied to the process. Of course, we all wish that
every dispute could be resolved in an amicable and respectful manner. The
reality is that this is simply not possible in every dispute. If a practitioner
is tied to one form of resolution, particularly if that practitioner is unable to
give a neutral assessment or description of the other processes, the integrity
of whatever system the client selects has already been compromised.132
When practitioners believe that the collaborative process is
fundamentally superior and can be applied to all family law cases, they will
have a natural resistance to terminating the process, even after it has
become apparent that settlement is not likely. Commentators are fond of
saying that the restriction on the collaborative lawyer from representing the
client in any related litigation keeps the lawyers at the table longer and
releases their creativity.133 That may be so in some cases, but when the
process is not functioning, the lawyers ought to leave the table. Staying
creates further financial and other hardships for the parties. Even where
one party is exhibiting controlling behavior over the other that is
unrecognized or inappropriately assessed by the professionals, the
negotiations may continue because of the collaborative team’s resistance to
terminating the process.134 In equating termination with “failure,” the team
will continue with the process as long as possible. If one views the
collaborative process simply as one possible method of resolution, and the
professional ego is detached from judgment of litigation or mediation, then
the collaborative process will terminate timely, freeing the parties to move
on to the next method of possible resolution.
There are multiple reasons for professionals to promptly terminate a
failing process. Of primary concern for the professionals is avoiding the
appearance of extending the process solely to increase revenue.
Professionals who contractually agree not to participate in related litigation
may be perceived as continuing the process for financial gain.135

132. See Krieger, supra note 102, at 253 (discussing the importance of screening for abuse
in mediation settings).
133. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 979–80.
134. Id. at 980.
135. Clients are often told that the collaborative process will be less expensive than
litigation. However, the client will have separate fee agreements with each member of the
collaborative team. Tesler, Family Law, supra note 3, at 331. The same claim is often
made of mediation. Pollet, supra note 70, at 43. This has not proven true in abuse cases
where subsequent litigation is likely because the controlling party has not obtained every
term he feels entitled to. Often the coercive partner will not abide by the mediation and the
parties will just keep returning to court, adding more costs to the target. Zorza, What Is
Wrong with Mediation, supra note 68, at 94.

100

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1

While collaborative law often provides a helpful and meaningful
service, professionals must be mindful “not to oversell any given process,
including Collaborative Law.”136 Many collaborative lawyers are former
family law litigators. Disenfranchised by increasing incivility and other
difficulties encountered in family law litigation practice, many have chosen
instead to embrace collaborative practice. The system is more comfortable
for them to learn because the lawyers continue to represent clients in a
somewhat traditional format. Unlike mediation where the lawyer must
adjust practice from advocacy to neutrality, the collaborative lawyer must
learn only to work as a “team” member and modify language from a
blaming vocabulary to a more holistic one. The support of other team
members makes the transition easier because of the mentoring that more
experienced team members provide. Once the transition is made, the
collaborative lawyer fears reverting back to a full-time litigation practice.
The impetus for the model to succeed at all costs can motivate the lawyer
to continue the collaborative process even when the parties are no longer
benefitting from the process. This fear contributes to the lawyer’s initial
resistance to recommending litigation as a necessary process for
appropriate cases.

V. THE RISKS OF APPLYING THE COLLABORATIVE
MODEL TO ABUSE CASES
All of the concerns noted regarding cases involving intimate partner
abuse entering into the mediation process are present in the collaborative
law arena. In addition, several aspects of the collaborative model that
make the process a rich experience in non-abusive situations can be the
very aspects of the process that increase risk for the coercively controlled
target.
A. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
Coercive partners are rarely honest with their targets.137 Financial
control, secrecy, and fraud are generally present in abusive relationships.138
Without safeguards or sanctions for failing to make accurate disclosures,
there is little incentive for coercive partners who have hidden assets to be
honest during the collaborative process.139 Without formal discovery

136. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 1012.
137. See generally, Wolf-Smith & LaRossa, supra note 55, at 325 (noting that coercive
partners will often apologize and make empty promises of changed behavior, only to
continue abusive behavior).
138. See generally Bellew, supra note 62 (describing the various forms of abuse that can
be employed).
139. Cf. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 41, at 179 (discussing how the batterer will
often only be honest and upfront in negotiations when either threatened with losing contact
with the children or as a means of trying to reconcile with the target).
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procedures,140 there is no subpoena process for verification of clientprovided information.
In fact, some nonfinancial disclosures could be made that jeopardize
the well-being of the targeted partner.141 For example, whether the target is
in a new relationship is often irrelevant to settlement discussions.
Obtaining this information can be a focus of coercive partners who use
many tools, including litigation and settlement processes, to discover the
whereabouts and activities of their partners.142 If there is to be transparency
and full disclosure, the collaborative model requires that no information
may be withheld.143 Disclosure of a target’s address, whereabouts, and
status of any new relationship could place both the target and any new
partner at serious risk of harm.144 The types of information that can place a
client at risk are particular to each individual situation. Transparency may
be an achievable goal in situations where the couples have a history of
good faith interactions. When couples have experienced abuse in an
intimate relationship, it can be presumed that one or both parties will lack
the good faith and/or respect components essential to successful
collaboration.
B. FOUR-WAY MEETINGS
An important part of the collaborative process is the use of frequent
face-to-face meetings, often called “four-way” meetings.145 This contact
with the coercive partner can be traumatizing for targets, particularly
during the early stages of separation and recovery. In fact, divorce and
custody proceedings can be a conduit for prolonging the effects of
traumatizing events.146 This trauma is compounded for those who have
been sexually assaulted, stalked, and emotionally or verbally abused by the
former partner. Post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other
mental health concerns can be found in some individuals who have been
abused.147 Many family law lawyers comprehend why a victim of stranger
rape would be discouraged from frequent meetings with the perpetrator.148
Yet when the assailant is an intimate partner, particularly where the parties
have children, the target is often encouraged to participate in face-to-face

140. See Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 69, at 12, 14.
141. Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting, supra note 81, at 290–91.
142. Pollema, supra note 123, at 1110.
143. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 57.
144. Pauline Quirion, Representing Victims of Domestic Violence, in MASSACHUSETTS
DIVORCE LAW PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 25.1, 25.9.11 (2008).
145. Voegele et al., supra note 5, at 984.
146. See generally Pollema, supra note 123, at 1110 (noting how coercive partners can use
the legal system as an instrument to perpetuate abuse).
147. Ann Coker et al., Physical and Mental Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence
for Men and Women, 23 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 260, 265 (2002).
148. Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting, supra note 81, at 295–96 (noting that society has
responded to protect victims of rape by way of special confidentiality privileges).
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meetings without regard for the impact those meetings may have on her
sense of safety and her mental health.149
Even those who have not been physically or sexually abused but have
been otherwise coercively controlled are usually not prepared for the
emotional impact of face-to-face meetings. While the meetings, at the right
point in recovery, may have some therapeutic value, the lawyers, coaches
and others involved with the clients are not qualified to predict whether the
meetings will be re-traumatizing or assistive in recovery.
The most dangerous time for targets of domestic abuse is the time
period during and after separation.150 The coercive partner’s concept of
“leaving” varies, and is defined by his perception of events.151 For
example, the target obtaining a job or applying for school may be perceived
by the coercive partner as an attempt to leave, even though the at-risk
partner may have no such plans. The perceived loss of control and the
coercive partner’s interpretation of the target’s actions are what trigger the
heightened danger, not the intention of the controlled party.
The danger associated with leaving can continue for some time
following separation.152 Any contact with the target during this period
increases the opportunity for a coercive partner to inflict further harm,
whether that harm is physical, emotional, or psychological.153 This is why
the “no contact” or “stay away” provisions of civil protection orders are the
most important terms for ensuring target safety.
Similarly, threats can be delivered in ways not understood other than
by the target. A settlement offer where the coercive partner insists on
taking the family dog could be a threat known only to the partner. The
coercive partner might have abused the family dog. Delivering this
demand in a face-to-face meeting could have a powerful effect on the atrisk partner.

VI. ETHICAL ISSUES
The ethical issues that are raised by involving abused partners in the
collaborative process are both in addition to, and different from, the issues
raised by collaborative law practice generally.154 Among the ethical issues
raised by collaborative law are the financial ability to hire successor
counsel, the timing of the process, emotional exhaustion, and the handling

149. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 41, at 185–87.
150. Lorena Garcia, Catalina Soria & Eric Hurwitz, Homicides and Intimate Partner
Violence: A Literature Review, 8 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 370, 374–75 (2007).
151. See Cathy Humphreys & Ravi K. Thiara, Neither Justice Nor Protection: Women’s
Experiences of Post-Separation Violence, 25 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 195, 198 (2003).
152. Id. at 199.
153. Id. at 199–200.
154. Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 157
(2008).
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of a target’s often unrealistic expectation regarding the outcome of the
process.
A. FINANCES AND THE ABILITY TO HIRE COUNSEL
Financial abuse is often present in coercive relationships.155 Money is
a powerful tool of control. Even if the family unit has substantial assets,
the at-risk partner typically does not have access to those resources without
the permission of the coercive partner.156 Targets who are working
professionals and earn a significant salary report that they cannot
independently access funds. Asserting independent financial control could
invite further abuse. When the target does have access to funds, she often
must account to her coercive partner for each penny spent.157
Consequently, targets rarely have sufficient resources to hire competent
counsel during the divorce process, let alone enough money to engage in
alternative processes that might not be successful.158 When targets do have
funds for a retainer, often those funds are limited.159 Most targets will not
have sufficient funds to hire successor counsel if the collaborative process
is terminated before resolution.160 This is a valid concern. The divorce
process is expensive and if the collaborative process is terminated without
resolution, targets may have substantial difficulty in hiring competent
counsel to represent them during divorce and custody litigation. Many
targets who find the collaborative process unsuccessful may need to
proceed with divorce and custody litigation pro se.161 This is an especially
dangerous practice for abused mothers.162
Compounding this concern is the difficulty that targets have in finding
counsel who understands the dynamics of domestic violence.163 A target
that enters the collaborative process in good faith might want the same
lawyer to represent her during subsequent litigation. Indeed, collaborative
counsel could be the most competent domestic violence lawyer in the
client’s geographic area. Ethically, before recommending the collaborative
155. Bellew, supra note 62, at 42–43.
156. Id. at 42.
157. Id.
158. Lisa E. Martin, Comment, Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim:
Due Process and the Victim’s Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 329, 344 (1998–99).
159. See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28
COLO. LAW. 19, 20 (1999) [hereinafter Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving] (discussing the
financial hardship faced by targets).
160. Martin, supra note 158, at 344.
161. Id. at 331.
162. See generally Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody
Determinations Among Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 991, 995 (2005) (describing how the “the psychological aftermath of
abuse” could even “lead to the appearance that the batterer will make a more fit parent than
the victim”).
163. See generally Martin, supra note 158, at 354–55 (discussing the various daunting
aspects of litigation for a target of domestic violence).
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process, the professionals should ensure that clients have sufficient funds to
hire competent successor counsel. Otherwise, clients may be left with little
choice but to enter into an agreement with unfavorable terms because they
cannot afford to engage other methods of resolution.
B. TIMING AND EXPECTATIONS
Before taking part in any settlement process, the target may need
significant time away from the controlling partner in order to recover selfconfidence. Traumatized targets may have difficulty organizing their
thoughts and responding appropriately to inquiries.164 Without sufficient
time for recovery, the target may have unrealistic expectations for the
outcome of the legal process. Those who have experienced abuse are eager
for the abuse to stop165 and will often feel that the professionals have the
power to change the coercive partner’s behavior. This expectation is
unrealistic because coercive partners rarely change tactics postCollaborative professionals are unable to enforce
separation.166
consequences for the controlling behavior, other than termination of the
collaborative process itself. Eager to begin the collaborative process early
in the client’s separation, the professionals are unable to enforce
boundaries. There is no incentive for many coercive partners to contain or
change behavior.167 The unreasonableness of the coercive partner’s
positions, and the continued use of controlling tactics, can bring a sense of
reality to the target.168 Only with sufficient recovery time, however, will
the targeted partner be able to understand and accept the limitations of any
ADR process in changing or controlling abusive behavior.
When expectation of changed behavior is no longer part of the client’s
decision-making process, the partner who has experienced abuse can make
more detached decisions about her future and the terms of separation.
However, the collaborative process often commences shortly after the
parties separate.169 This is not only a very dangerous time for the target,
but it is also a time when she may not be sufficiently separated from the
coercive partner to appreciate the extent to which she was abused.170 She
may not realize how the abuse changed her personality and behavior.
While the client is in a traumatized state, she is not as likely to make
appropriate decisions on issues that will affect her and her children for

164. HERMAN, supra note 46, at 93–95.
165. Cf. Hoyle, supra note 95, at 155 (noting that targets who call the police are often
times more interested in ending their abuse than in punishing their partners).
166. Quirion, supra note 144, at para. 25–7.
167. Cf. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 41, at 185 (discussing other forms of
motivation for batterers to change their behavior, apart from sanctions).
168. Id. at 5.
169. See Peppet, supra note 154, at 133–34.
170. HERMAN, supra note 46, at 158.
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years into the future. In fact, the target may not even be able to recall
details of traumatizing events early after separation.
C. EMOTIONAL EXHAUSTION
Those who have been controlled in intimate relationships may come to
the professionals in an exhausted state.171 The traumatized client needs
support and empowerment to heal.172 If the collaborative team is not
focused on supporting the traumatized client and postponing negotiations
until the client has made substantial recovery, the collaborative process is
not an appropriate remedy. If controlling tactics continue post-separation,
which is the case in most coercive control situations, the process is not
going to support healing for either party. The controlling partner will be
empowered by the process to continue his control.173 The coercive
partner’s controlling tactics may be difficult for the collaborative team to
recognize as they may be peculiar to the particular target.174 For example,
pet abuse is a common tactic of control in abusive relationships. As
mentioned earlier, in some cases, coercive partners insist on continued
control of a pet as part of settlement in an effort to send a message to the
abused partner that she had better do what the partner wants or the pet will
be abused. The same tactic can be used for anything or anyone that the
target values. This is why threats to take the children are particularly
powerful.
If the target is exposed to threats throughout the collaborative process,
she will give up on the process, disappointed that the coercive partner was
not contained.175 As previously noted, this attitude leads to settlement on
unsatisfactory terms.176 For those concerned about malpractice, the
arrangement is fraught with possibilities of later claims.177 Releases and
waivers may be unenforceable when signed by someone who is in a
traumatized state.178

171. See generally HERMAN, supra note 46, at 134–35 (enumerating the mental state of an
abuse target when they enter into therapy).
172. Id. at 133.
173. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 41, at 113–29.
174. Id. at 79.
175. See generally Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, supra note 159, at 22 (noting that
mediation can also leave the target feeling disappointed that the coercive partner was not
controlled).
176. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 41, at 117, 125.
177. See generally Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are We
Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 7, 12–20 (2005) (identifying some of the possible
claims that the client may later bring. For example, the client could claim that the lawyer
recommended the collaborative process without appreciation of how traumatising it would
be for the client to be exposed to her abuser).
178. For example, in an Ohio case the court upheld a finding that a separation agreement
was signed under duress where the husband made threats to his wife and there had been
repeated acts of abuse during marriage. Quebodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 657 N.E.2d 539, 541
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995); In a South Carolina case, the court upheld the trial court’s finding
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VII. CONCLUSION
While family law practitioners nobly search for ways to minimize the
angst of separation and divorce, few acknowledge their role in exacerbating
their clients’ trauma. Collaborative practitioners must consider the risk to
engaging abused partners in their practice. Collaboration works best with
clients who can be respectful and honest with each other. Those
characteristics are not compatible with abusive relationships.

that a separation agreement resulted from undue influence where the wife was beaten by her
husband and subjected to constant mental abuse. Jackson v. Jackson, 310 S.E.2d 827, 828
(S.C. Ct. App. 1983).

